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Faigman David
NOTES
THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME AND SELF-DEFENSE: A
LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL DISSENT
The abuse of women is a significant social problem,' with some re-
searchers estimating that twenty-eight percent of all married women suf-
fer abuse at the hands of their husbands.2 Domestic violence often
culminates with the woman killing her mate.3 With increasing frequency
abused women charged with killing their husbands or lovers justify their
acts as self-defense and seek to support these claims with expert testi-
mony on "battered woman syndrome. '4 In self-defense cases this testi-
mony typically centers on two theories of battering relationships that to-
gether purport to explain why some women stay in battering relationships
and ultimately kill their tormentors. The scholarly commentary has over-
' See generally R. Gelles & C. Cornell, Intimate Violence in Families 63-81 (1985) (dis-
cussing factors leading to wife abuse); U.S. Dep't of Justice, Attorney General's Task Force
on Family Violence: Final Report (1984) (recommending judicial responses to family vio-
lence); The Dark Side of Families: Current Family Violence Research (1983) (collection of
studies documenting the causes and extent of wife abuse).
2 See M. Straus, R. Gelles & S. Steinmetz, Behind Closed Doors: Violence in the Ameri-
can Family 32 (1980). These estimates are generally limited to the incidence of physical
rather than psychological abuse, though researchers often measure both. See L. Walker,
The Battered Woman Syndrome 27-28 (1984) [hereinafter cited as L. Walker (1984)]. One
study found that 44 of 80 couples interviewed engaged in some form of physical violence
during their marriages. R. Gelles, The Violent Home: A Study of Physical Aggression Be-
tween Husbands and Wives 48 (1972); see also L. Walker, The Battered Woman ix (1979)
[hereinafter cited as L. Walker (1979)] (estimating that 50% of all women are battered at
some time during their marriages).
3 See Roy, Some Thoughts Regarding the Criminal Justice System and Wifebeating, in
Battered Women: A Psychosociological Study of Domestic Violence 139 (M. Roy ed. 1977).
4 See cases cited infra note 6. Self-defense has emerged as the preferred defense for
women who have killed their spouses, but some defendants use expert testimony on bat-
tering relationships to support other defenses, such as insanity or diminished capacity. See
Hawthorne v. State, 408 So. 2d 801, 806 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (battered woman syn-
drome evidence offered to show that defendant suffered from an impaired mental state).
The facts of many of these cases, however, do not lend themselves to these defenses. See
Schneider & Jordan, Representation of Women Who Defend Themselves in Response to
Physical or Sexual Assault, 4 Women's Rts. L. Rep. 149, 153-60 (1978); Comment, The Bat-
tered Wife Syndrome: A Potential Defense to a Homicide Charge, 6 Pepperdine L. Rev. 213,
221-23 (1978).
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whelmingly endorsed the use of battered woman syndrome evidence.5
Similarly, several appellate courts have upheld the admissibility of bat-
tered woman syndrome evidence or have remanded cases to the trial
courts for failure to examine adequately the relevance of such evidence.6
' See Buda & Butler, The Battered Wife Syndrome: A Backdoor Assault on Domestic
Violence, 23 J. Fain. L. 359, 368-78 (1984-85); Crocker, The Meaning of Equality for Bat-
tered Women Who Kill Men in Self-Defense, 8 Harv. Women's L.J. 121, 137-44 (1985);
Comment, Self-Defense: Battered Woman Syndrome on Trial, 20 Cal. W.L. Rev. 485 (1984)
[hereinafter cited as Comment, Self-Defense]; Note, Defense Strategies for Battered Women
Who Assault Their Mates: State v. Curry, 4 Harv. Women's L.J. 161 (1981); Note, The
Battered Wife's Dilemma: To Kill or To Be Killed, 32 Hastings L.J. 895 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as Note, Wife's Dilemma]; Comment, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony on Bat-
tered Wife Syndrome: An Evidentiary Analysis, 77 Nw. U.L. Rev. 348 (1982) [hereinafter
cited as Comment, Evidentiary Analysis]; Note, Battered Woman's Syndrome and Premen-
strual Syndrome: A Comparison of Their Possible Use as Defenses to Criminal Liability, 59
St. John's L. Rev. 558 (1985); Comment, The Use of Expert Testimony in the Defense of
Battered Women, 52 U. Colo. L. Rev. 587 (1981); Note, A Woman, A Horse, and a Hickory
Tree: The Development of Expert Testimony on The Battered Woman Syndrome in Homi-
cide Cases, 53 UMKC L. Rev. 386, 397-410 (1985); Comment, The Expert as Educator: A
Proposed Approach to the Use of Battered Woman Syndrome Expert Testimony, 35 Vand.
L. Rev. 741 (1982); Comment, The Battered Spouse Syndrome as a Defense to a Homicide
Charge Under the Pennsylvania Crimes Code, 26 Vill. L. Rev. 105 (1980-81); Comment,
Evidence: Admitting Expert Testimony on the Battered Woman Syndrome, 21 Washburn
L.J. 689 (1982). But see Acker & Toch, Battered Women, Straw Men, and Expert Testi-
mony: A Comment on State v. Kelly, 21 Crim. L. Bull. 125 (1985); Note, Does Wife Abuse
Justify Homicide? 24 Wayne L. Rev. 1705 (1978).
' The use of battered woman syndrome evidence was noted by Justice Brennan, joined by
Justice Marshall, in a dissent from denial of certiorari in Moran v. Ohio, 105 S. Ct. 350
(1984). Justice Brennan observed that "[a]lthough traditional self-defense theory may seem
to fit the situation only imperfectly,. . . the battered woman's syndrome as a self-defense
theory has gained increasing support over recent years." Id. at 351 (citations and footnote
omitted). In State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d 892 (Me. 1981), the court ruled that an expert on
battered woman syndrome should have been allowed to testify to "his profession's analysis
of the behavior and emotional patterns of women suffering from repeated physical abuse
inflicted by their husbands or lovers." Id. at 893. The court held that testimony as to the
"cyclical process" of the abuse, "the psychological and environmental factors which contrib-
ute to the individual male's disposition towards abuse," and the fact that "abused women
often continue to live with their abusers even though beatings continue" were all relevant to
the defendant's reliance on the "theory of self-defense or provocation to mitigate or justify
her conduct." Id. at 893-94 (footnote omitted). Similarly, in Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 612, 277
S.E.2d 678 (1981), the court held that the expert should have been allowed to testify. Ac-
cording to the court, the expert could testify "that it is not unusual for a battered woman
who has been abused over a long period of time to remain in such a situation" and that "the
battered woman becomes increasingly afraid for her own well-being, and that the primary
emotion of a battered woman is fear." Id. at 614, 277 S.E.2d at 680; accord State v. Allery,
101 Wash. 2d 591, 596-97, 682 P.2d 312, 315-16 (1984) (expert could testify regarding the
"three distinct phases" of the syndrome and "why a person suffering from the battered
woman syndrome would not leave her mate, would not inform police or friends, and would
fear increased aggression against herself"); cf. State v. Baker, 120 N.H. 773, 775-76, 424 A.2d
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The use of this evidence to support self-defense claims is troubling be-
cause the facts of these cases often do not conform to traditional concep-
tions of self-defense. Typically, the term "self-defense" conjures up
images of a defender who, backed against a wall and facing imminent
death, strikes out at the last moment to kill the attacker.7 Frequently,
however, a battered woman kills her mate after an attack has ended or at
some time when, seemingly, no immediate threat is present.8 Further, a
171, 172-73 (1980) (in a prosecution of a husband for wife abuse, expert on the battered
woman syndrome permitted to rebut the defendant's contention that he abused his wife
because he was insane). Several appellate courts have expressed approval of battered woman
syndrome testimony but have remanded to the trial court for determination of its admissi-
bility. In Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626 (D.C. 1979), for example, the court
stated that the "testimony on battered wives was highly probative" and remanded to allow
the trial court to evaluate the scientific acceptability of the evidence. Id. at 639-40. The trial
court again barred the expert testimony, and the appellate court affirmed. See Ibn-Tamas v.
United States, 455 A.2d 893, 894 (D.C. 1983); see also Hawthorne v. State, 408 So. 2d 801,
806 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (observing that "there has been no determination below as to
the . . . extent to which [the expert's] methodology is generally accepted . . ... "); State v.
Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 213, 478 A.2d 364, 381 (1984) (prosecutor not "given the opportunity
fully to cross-examine the expert on the reliability of this developing field of scientific
knowledge").
Not all courts have been receptive to expert testimony on battered woman syndrome.
Some have questioned the scientific acceptability of the evidence. In Buhrle v. State, 627
P.2d 1374 (Wyo. 1981), the court did not expressly fid the evidence inadmissible, but it
observed that "the state of the art was not adequately demonstrated to the court, and be-
cause of inadequate foundation the proposed opinions would not aid the jury." Id. at 1378.
Other courts have rejected the evidence in the case at hand without addressing its admissi-
bility generally. See, e.g., State v. Martin, 666 S.W.2d 895, 899 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984). Still
other courts have flatly excluded the evidence as irrelevant to the woman's self-defense
claim. See People v. White, 90 IMI. App. 3d 1067, 1072, 414 N.E.2d 196, 200 (1980) ("The
opinion of the doctor [on battered woman syndrome] was neither relevant nor material, and
it would serve no useful purpose."); State v. Thomas, 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 520-22, 423 N.E.2d
137, 139-40 (1981) (holding that the evidence should be excluded because: (1) "it is irrele-
vant;" (2) the subject matter "is within the understanding of the jury;" (3) the testimony is
"not. . . a matter of commonly accepted scientific knowledge;" and (4) "its prejudicial im-
pact outweighs its probative value").
Attention to the problem of wife abuse has not been limited to the courts. The California
legislature, for example, recently enacted a statute directed at abusive husbands. See Cal.
Penal Code § 273.5 (West 1986) (making willful corporal injury to a spouse resulting in a
traumatic condition a felony with a penalty of up to four years in prison); see also J. Costa,
Abuse of Women: Legislation, Reporting and Prevention 39-74 (1983) (listing state statutes
relating to wife abuse); Note, Wife Abuse Legislation in California, Pennsylvania and Texas,
7 Thurgood Marshall L. Rev. 282 (1982) (examining three representative state statutes pro-
viding civil and criminal penalties for wife abuse).
7 See Note, Dwelling Defense Law in Missouri: In Search of Castles, 50 UMKC L. Rev.
64, 66 (1981). This "retreat to the wall" is "reached in a figurative sense when further re-
treat would increase the danger to defendant's life." 2 Wharton's Criminal Law § 126, at
131-32 (C. Torcia 14th ed. 1979).
$ Cases in which the woman kills her mate while he is sleeping present perhaps the most
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woman in a violent relationship would appear always to have an alterna-
tive to killing the man-leaving the relationship. Recognizing the incon-
gruities between the facts of their cases and conventional notions of self-
defense, battered women defendants seek to use social science research on
battered woman syndrome to bring themselves within the bounds of self-
defense doctrine.
This note questions the validity of the research on battered woman
syndrome and argues that in self-defense cases courts should not admit
expert testimony based on this research.' The focus here is primarily on
the work of Lenore Walker, the preeminent researcher in the field.10 Not-
withstanding the weaknesses of the research on battered woman syn-
drome, it is clear that many battered women face a desparate predica-
ment, and this note argues that courts should allow juries to consider
valid social science research and the battered woman's own history of
abuse in evaluating her self-defense claim. Part I of the note discusses the
defense of self-defense and the connection between the theory of battered
woman syndrome and self-defense doctrine. Part H critically examines
the research on battered woman syndrome and rejects its application to
self-defense cases. Part III identifies the types of evidence courts should
admit when a battered woman relies on the defense of self-defense.
striking instances of "self-defensive" action taking place despite the apparent absence of an
immediate threat to the woman. See, e.g., State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811 (N.D. 1983).
' This note concentrates on the use of battered woman syndrome evidence in cases where
the woman is charged with killing her husband or lover. The defense of self-defense, of
course, is also applicable to lesser offenses, such as assault or battery, see 2 Wharton's Crim-
inal Law, supra note 7, § 192, and women might conceivably seek to introduce evidence on
battered woman syndrome in criminal prosecutions for these lesser offenses. Most of the
legal commentary, however, has centered on the murder and manslaughter cases, and it is
these cases that most clearly illuminate the tension between the theories of battered woman
syndrome and the legal doctrine of self-defense.
10 Of the researchers who have investigated battering relationships, Walker is the most
active in relating battered woman research to the legal context, and it is her work that
courts most often rely on in their decisions. See, e.g., State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 193, 478
A.2d 364, 371 (1984) (relying almost exclusively on Walker's theory and referring to her as a
"prominent writer" in the field); Buhrle v. State, 627 P.2d 1374, 1376 (Wyo. 1981) ("by her
own characterization [Walker] is the foremost authority on [battered woman syndrome]").
Law review commentary similarly recognizes Walker's central role in bringing battered wo-,
man syndrome evidence to the courtroom. See, e.g., Crocker, supra note 5, at 128 (citing
Walker's research as the "prevailing theory on battering"); Comment, Evidentiary Analysis,
supra note 5, at 350 (describing Walker as "the research pioneer in this area"). To be sure,
many other researchers are involved in this field. See, e.g., R. Gelles, supra note 2; J. Giles-
Sims, Wife Battering: A Systems Theory Approach (1983); R. Langley & R. Levy, Wife
Beating: The Silent Crisis (1977); D. Martin, Battered Wives (1976); Battered Women: A
Psychosociological Study of Domestic Violence (M. Roy ed. 1977).
622
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I. SELF-DEFENSE AND BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME
When a battered woman invokes the defense of self-defense in a crimi-
nal prosecution, she must of course cast her arguments in terms of the
traditional elements of that defense. When the circumstances of a case do
not cleanly fit the traditional model of self-defense, the defendant may
seek to introduce evidence on battered woman syndrome in an attempt to
convince the jury that her case does in fact contain all of the requisite
elements of a self-defense claim. This section briefly surveys the law of
self-defense and analyzes the application of battered woman syndrome
theories to self-defense cases.
A. The Defense of Self-Defense
To prevail on a self-defense claim, a defendant must satisfy the four
elements of the defense. First, at the time of her action she must have
believed that she was in imminent danger of unlawful bodily harm.1' Sec-
ond, she must have used only a reasonable amount of force to counter the
threatened danger.12 Third, she cannot have been the aggressor.'3 Fourth,
under some circumstances she must have had no opportunity to retreat
safely.1'4 Courts often view the four elements of a self-defense claim as
" W. LaFave & A. Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law § 53, at 391 (1972). When the harm
is imminent, the threatened party essentially has no choice but to act; not acting means
certain harm. Professor Fletcher explains that "[s]tressing the element of involuntariness is
but our way of making the moral claim that [the actor] is not to be blamed for the kind of
choice that other people would make under the same circumstances." G. Fletcher, Rethink-
ing Criminal Law 856 (1978).
11 W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 11, at 391. An actor is limited to the use of
nondeadly force against a nondeadly attack, but she can respond to deadly force with deadly
force of her own. Id. at 392. LaFave and Scott define deadly force as "force (a) which its
user uses with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury to another or (b) which he
knows creates a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to the other." Id. (footnote
omitted).
23 Id. at 394-95.
14 Id. at 391. The law's attitude toward the duty to retreat reflects the tensions underly-
ing self-defense doctrine generally. On one hand, an individual should be encouraged to
retreat in order to avoid injury to herself or the aggressor. At the same time, one who is
attacked should not be required to adopt a cowardly or humiliating posture. The majority of
American jurisdictions impose no duty to retreat if the aggressor employs deadly force and
the defender reasonably believes that she is in danger of death or serious bodily injury. A
substantial minority of states, however, require the defending party to retreat if she can do
so in complete safety. Id. at 395-96.
An individual has no duty to retreat if attacked by an intruder in her home. Courts are
divided, though, on whether there is an obligation to retreat when the assailant is a co-
occupant of the dwelling. See id. at 396 n.36; Annot., 26 A.L.R.3d 1296 (1969). A majority of
jurisdictions do not require retreat when the assault occurs within the home and the assail-
ant is a co-occupant. The rationale for this position apparently is that the defender has no
1986] 623
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categorical requirements, 5 but an analysis of these elements should not
lose sight of the basic premise of this defense: where an individual cannot
resort to the law in response to aggression, she may use reasonable force
to protect herself from physical harm.'6
Most American courts have traditionally required juries evaluating the
first element of a self-defense claim to focus on the objective reasonable-
ness of the defendant's belief that she was in imminent danger." Under
this objective test, the defendant must in fact have believed self-defense
was necessary, and this belief must also have been reasonable by the stan-
dards of the ordinary person.' By contrast, the subjective test followed in
a minority of jurisdictions requires only that the defendant have honestly
believed that self-defensive action was necessary; that this belief was un-
reasonable will not defeat the defendant's claim."9 Clearly, though, the
safer place to which she can escape. W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 11, at 396 n.36.
Nevertheless, a minority of jurisdictions ignore this logic and impose a duty to retreat in
this situation. Id.; see Schneider, Equal Rights to Trial for Women: Sex Bias in the Law of
Self-Defense, 15 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 623, 633 (1980); Note, Limits on the Use of Defen-
sive Force to Prevent Intramarital Assaults, 10 Rut.-Cam. L.J. 643, 654 (1979).
15 See W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 11, at 392 ("On the question of what is reasona-
ble, the law of self-defense has tended 'to ossify into specific rules,' not always fixed with
regard to reason.") (quoting Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921) (Holmes, J.)).
16 See generally G. Fletcher, supra note 11, at 855-75 (contrasting the theory of necessary
defense, which considers the pressures bearing on the defender, with the theory of self-
defense, which asks, "Who was the aggressor?").
17 See W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 11, at 393-94. 40 Am. Jur. 2d Homicide § 154
(1968) sets forth the minority and majority positions, noting that the objective test is fol-
lowed by most states:
The rule adopted in a few states, and what seems to have been the common-law
rule, is that when a person is assaulted and kills his assailant in self-defense, the
question to be determined is whether the slayer, under all the circumstances as they
appeared to him, honestly believed that he was in imminent danger of losing his life,
or of suffering great bodily harm, and that it was necessary to do what he did in order
to save himself from such apparent threatened danger, and it is not whether a reason-
able man, or a man of reasonable courage, would have so believed.
The rule followed by most of the courts is that the apprehension of danger and
belief of necessity which will justify killing in self-defense must be a reasonable ap-
prehension and belief, such as a reasonable man would, under the circumstances,
have entertained.
Id. at 443 (footnotes omitted).
13 See, e.g., State v. Mendoza, 80 Wis. 2d 122, 150, 258 N.W.2d 260, 272 (1977).
19 See Vigil v. People, 143 Colo. 328, 353 P.2d 82 (1960). The Model Penal Code adopts
the subjective test. "[T]he use of force upon or toward another person is justifiable when
the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting
himself against the use of unlawful force by such other person on the present occasion."
Model Penal Code § 3.04(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). Under the Model Code "deadly
force is not justifiable ... unless the actor believes that such force is necessary to protect
himself against death, serious bodily harm, kidnapping or sexual intercourse compelled by
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distinction between the objective and subjective tests can be an evanes-
cent one. A court nominally applying the objective test may allow the jury
to consider so many of the defendant's unique circumstances that the hy-
pothetical "reasonable person" assumes most of the fears and weaknesses
of the defendant. The jury may therefore come very close to evaluating
the necessity of self-defensive action as the defendant saw it.
State v. Wanrow0 illustrates the extension of the objective test to take
account of the unusual circumstances facing the defendant at the time of
the act.2 ' The court believed that this extension was necessary to allow
the jury to "'stand as nearly as practicable in the shoes of the defendant,
and from this point of view determine the character of the act.' ",22 In
Wanrow the defendant differed from the ordinary person in two impor-
tant respects. First, at the time of the killing the defendant was aware of
her victim's history of violence, and the court found this relevant to the
reasonableness of her self-defensive action: "circumstances predating the
killing by weeks and months [are]... entirely proper, and in fact essen-
tial, to a proper disposition of the claim of self-defense. '23 Second, be-
cause the defendant was significantly smaller than her victim and had a
broken leg,24 the court held that the jury should not have compared the
defendant's response to the perceived danger with what an ordinarily ro-
bust person would be expected to do in the situation. In particular, the
court found it unreasonable to expect someone with the physical charac-
teristics of the defendant to fend off an attack without using a weapon.25
Thus, in the version of the objective test set forth in Wanrow, it is proper
for the jury to consider both the defendant's knowledge at the time of the
killing and her individual physical traits.
The Wanrow court was somewhat atypical in its willingness to allow
the jury to consider the defendant's idiosyncracies in evaluating the rea-
sonableness of her actions. Most courts exclude evidence of the defend-
ant's idiosyncracies and require the jury to consider the self-defense claim
in light of a more rigorously objective standard of conduct.2e Neverthe-
less, Wanrow highlights the basic flexibility of the reasonable person test
force or threat . . . ." Id. § 3.02(2)(b).
20 88 Wash. 2d 221, 559 P.2d 548 (1977).
21 See id. at 234, 559 P.2d at 555.
21 Id. at 235, 559 P.2d at 556 (quoting State v. Ellis, 30 Wash. 369, 373, 70 P. 963, 964-65
(1902)).
" Id.
24 Id. at 240, 559 P.2d at 559. The victim, who apparently had molested Wanrow's daugh-
ter and had attempted to molest her son, was a large man and was "visibly intoxicated." Id.
at 226, 559 P.2d at 551.
25 Id. at 240, 559 P.2d at 558.
2 See, e.g., State v. Bess, 53 N.J. 10, 247 A.2d 669 (1968).
1986]
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of self-defense, a flexibility that battered woman defendants often at-
tempt to exploit.
B. Battered Woman Syndrome
Research on battered woman syndrome offers two theories that defend-
ants use to address the discrepancies between the paradigm of self-de-
fense and the facts of their cases. First, battered women defendants27 rely
on the "Walker cycle theory" to show that, although the "defensive" act
may have occured during a period of relative calm, the defendant was
reasonable in her belief at the time of the act that the man presented her
with a threat of imminent harm.2 Second, defendants use Walker's ex-
tension of the psychological theory of learned helplessness to explain the
incapacity of the battered woman to leave the abusive relationship. 29 De-
fendants do not offer battered woman syndrome as the basis of a separate
defense or even as a means of extending traditional self-defense theory.30
They merely seek to use the theories of battered woman syndrome to
demonstrate the reasonableness of the woman's actions in light of the
battering relationship. Like the defendant in Wanrow, they attempt to fit
their claims within the framework of existing self-defense doctrine.
27 Walker defines a battered woman as any woman "18 years of age or over, who is or has
been in an intimate relationship with a man who repeatedly subjects or subjected her to
forceful physical and/or psychological abuse." L. Walker (1984), supra note 2, at 203.
Walker's definition is expansive, perhaps to a degree few legal observers realize. Walker
defines an intimate relationship as one "having a romantic, affectionate, or sexual compo-
nent." Id. "Repeatedly" merely means "more than once." Id. Finally, "abuse" includes, in
addition to physical assaults, "extreme verbal harassment and expressing comments of a
derogatory nature with negative value judgments." Id.
11 See Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 634 (D.C. 1979) (expert would provide
"a basis from which the jury could understand why [the defendant] perceived herself in
imminent danger at the time of the shooting"); State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 204, 478 A.2d
364, 377 (1984) ("expert's testimony, if accepted by the jury, would have aided it in deter-
mining whether, under the circumstances, a reasonable person would have believed there
was imminent danger to her life"); State v. Kelly, 102 Wash. 2d 188, 196, 685 P.2d 564, 570
(1984) (expert testimony "offered to aid the jury in understanding the reasonableness of
[the defendant's] apprehension of imminent death or bodily injury").
29 See, e.g., State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 196, 478 A.2d 364, 372 (1984).
30 See State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 820 n.8 (N.D. 1983) ("[T]he law of self-defense
will not be judicially orchestrated to accomodate a theory that the existence of battered
woman syndrome in an abusive relationship operates in and of itself to justify or excuse a
homicide."); see also Comment, Self-Defense, supra note 5, at 495 ("The battered woman
syndrome is not in or of itself a defense. The defense which is asserted is self-defense, not
that the woman was a battered woman."). But see Vaughn & Moore, The Battered Spouse
Defense in Kentucky, 10 N. Ky. L. Rev. 399, 399 (1983) ("The defense of battered women
who kill their mates is slowly developing a distinct style or technique called the abused
spouse defense. This defense emerges as akin to, but separate from, the more familiar and
established defenses of self-defense and diminished capacity.").
[Vol. 72:619
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1. The Cycle Theory
The Walker cycle theory31 forms the conceptual bridge that spans the
time gap between the batterer's threat of death or serious bodily harm
and the defendant's act. Walker describes three distinct phases of the
typical battering relationship. A "tension building phase" erupts into an
"acute battering incident," which is in turn followed by "loving contri-
tion. '3 2 The first phase is marked by verbal bickering and increasing ten-
sion between the man and woman.3 3 In the second phase the batterer ex-
plodes into an uncontrollable and violent rage.34 In the final phase the
batterer typically expresses regret and profusely apologizes, usually prom-
ising never to beat the woman again.35 Despite the man's promises during
this third phase, the cycle eventually begins anew.3 6
According to the cycle theory, the battered woman is reduced to a state
of fear and anxiety during the first two phases of the cycle,3 7 and her
perception of danger extends beyond the time of the battering episodes
themselves. A "cumulative terror" consumes the woman and holds her in
constant fear of harm.38 This fear of harm continues even during the
peaceful interlude between episodes of abuse.3 9 It is during this peaceful
interlude that the woman may seize the opportunity to strike back at the
batterer.40 Thus, according to Walker's theory, the woman experiences
the growing tension of phase one, develops a fear of death or serious bod-
fly harm during phase two, and, perceiving that she will be unable to de-
fend herself when the next attack comes, finally "defends" herself at her
only opportunity.
S For a discussion of the cycle theory, see L. Walker (1984), supra note 2, at 95-104; L.
Walker (1979), supra note 2, at 55-70. Battered woman defendants frequently draw on as-
pects of Walker's research other than the cycle theory. See infra notes 43-55 and accompa-
nying text (discussion of learned helplessness theory). The cycle theory, however, is the
lynchpin of her work, and Walker describes many of her other findings in relation to that
theory. See Gates, Book Review, 8 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 301, 302 (1979) (reviewing
L. Walker (1979), supra note 2) ("The most original and legally significant of Walker's ideas
is what she calls the 'cycle of violence' between two people.").
"I See L. Walker (1984), supra note 2, at 95-96; L. Walker (1979), supra note 2, at 55-70.
L. Walker (1984), supra note 2, at 95.
34 Id. at 96.
33 Id.
34 Id.
37 See Note, Wife's Dilemma, supra note 5, at 928; see also infra notes'102-106 and ac-
companying text (criticizing this aspect of the cycle theory).
' See Comment, Battered Wives Who Kill: Double Standard Out of Court, Single Stan-
dard In? 2 Law & Hum. Behav. 133, 164 (1978).
39 See Buda & Butler, supra note 5, at 375.
40 Walker observes, "Sometimes, [the battered woman] strikes back during a calm period,
knowing that the tension is building towards another acute battering incident, where this
time she may die." L. Walker (1984), supra note 2, at 142.
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The cycle theory addresses the two factors upon which the Wanrow
court focused-the defendant's knowledge of the aggressor's history of vi-
olence and the defendant's physical inability to protect herself.41 First,
the battered woman's knowledge of the batterer's history of violence
shapes her perception of harm. A woman's experience in the recurring
cycles of violence puts her in constant fear of what appears to her as im-
minent harm. This factor goes to the first element of the battered wo-
man's self-defense claim, the reasonableness of her belief in the necessity
for self-defensive action. If the court allows the defendant to introduce
evidence on the implications of the cycle theory, the defendant may be
able to convince the jury that a reasonable person in her position would
have perceived imminent danger and responded accordingly.
Second, battered woman cases typically involve women who cannot eas-
ily defend themselves against the attacks of a larger and stronger man.
Here the cycle theory speaks to the second element of the self-defense
claim, the reasonableness of the amount of force used to repel the aggres-
sion. If a woman perceives herself to be trapped in a cycle of potentially
deadly violence, she may reasonably feel compelled to resort to deadly




The cycle theory, in itself, may be insufficient to convince a jury that
the battered woman acted in self-defense. Some states require the de-
fendant to show that she could not have retreated from the threat of
harm.43 More generally, Walker has argued that, even in jurisdictions that
do not formally impose a duty to retreat, jurors will assume the defend-
ant was unreasonable in failing to leave the battering relationship.44 Ac-
41 See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
"' Schneider sets forth an interesting hypothesis relating a woman's disadvantage in size
to the escalating violence that ultimately results in the death of her mate. Women, she
notes, are socialized not to use weapons, but battered women eventually learn weapons are
necessary after unsuccessful attempts to defend themselves unarmed, which ultimately lead
to more abuse. Schneider, supra note 14, at 632; see also Mackinnon, Toward Feminist Ju-
risprudence, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 703, 732 (1982) ("[W]omen thus perceive the need and do
need to resort to deadly force, [and] are more threatened than a similarly situated man,
largely because they are less able to care for themselves than they would be if they were
trained the way men are trained.").
4 See supra note 14.
" Walker asserts that "[d]espite the legal right in most states to stand one's own ground
on one's own property, women appear to be expected to have good reason for not leaving
their homes or withdrawing from their marriages if they are under the threat of or actually
experiencing assault." Walker, Thyfault & Browne, Beyond the Jurors' Ken: Battered
Women, 7 Vt. L. Rev 1, 5 (1982).
[Vol. 72-619
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cording to Walker, jurors subscribe to "popular myths" regarding women
who remain in violent relationships. These myths include "the belief that
battered women are masochistic, that they stay with their mates because
they like beatings, that the violence fulfills a deep-seated need within
each partner, or that they are free to leave such relationships if that is
what they really want.' 45 Courts have accepted Walker's view that jurors,
if not specially instructed, will believe the battered woman somehow con-
sented to the beatings inflicted upon her.46
To explain why a woman in a "constant state of fear" does not simply
leave the battering relationship, battered women defendants invoke
Walker's adaptation of Martin Seligman's "learned helplessness" the-
ory.47 Seligman and his colleagues found that laboratory dogs, after being
subjected to repeated shocks over which they had no control, "learned"
that they were helpless. 48 When subsequently placed in an escapable situ-
ation, the dogs failed to escape.49 Seligman generalized this phenomenon
45 Id. at 1-2.
41 In State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 478 A.2d 364 (1984), the court held that a jury must
consider the factors restraining a battered woman before it can evaluate her conduct The
court stated that "[o]nly by understanding these unique pressures that force battered
women to remain with their mates, despite their long-standing and reasonable fear of severe
bodily harm and the isolation that being a battered woman creates, can a battered woman's
state of mind be accurately and fairly understood." Id. at 196, 478 A.2d at 372.
The courts frequently voice their assumption that most lay people-and hence most ju-
rors-believe battered women enjoy the abuse. See, e.g., id. at 194, 478 A.2d at 370. Indeed,
this proposition seems to have taken on mythical proportions itself. The source the courts
most often cite to buttress their assumption is Walker's 1979 book, The Battered Woman,
which contains no empirical research on this question. See L. Walker (1979), supra note 2,
at 20. Walker merely alludes (without providing a reference) to a twenty-year-old study on
abused wives suggesting that some women might enjoy the abuse because of masochistic
tendencies. Id. Perhaps Walker is referring to a 1964 study that characterized battered
women as "aggressive, efficient, masculine, and sexually frigid" and suggested the beatings
provided "apparent masochistic gratification." Snell, Rosenwald & Robey, The Wifebeater's
Wife: A Study of Family Interaction, 11 Archives Gen. Psychiatry 107, 111 (1964). At most,
this severely outdated study shows only that some research psychologists believe women
enjoy beatings; it cannot be taken to show that the general public holds this view. See Acker
& Toch, supra note 5, at 138-41 (noting that many jurors may be sympathetic to the wo-
man's failure to leave). See generally P. Caplan, The Myth of Women's Masochism (1985)
(exploring the psychoanalytic evidence regarding the masochism of women and questioning
its validity).
'7 See L. Walker (1984), supra note 2, at 86.
4' See Seligman, Maier & Geer, Alleviation of Learned Helplessness in the Dog, 73 J.
Abnormal Psychology 256 (1968). Seligman and his associates placed the dogs in harnesses
and subjected them to electrical shocks at random intervals. After initial attempts to escape
proved futile, the dogs began to submit to the shocks without resistance. When the proce-
dure was changed to present the dogs with an opportunity to escape, the "helpless" dogs
failed to respond.
" Many dogs overcame their helplessness after the experimenter physically dragged them
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to depression in humans.50 Walker, applying this theory to the problem of
battered women, explains that "the women's experiences . . . of their at-
tempts to control the violence would; over time, produce learned helpless-
ness and depression as the 'repeated batterings, like electrical shocks, di-
minish the woman's motivation to respond.'-51 The court in State v.
Kelly52 embraced this view, asserting that some women "become so de-
moralized and degraded by the fact that they cannot predict or control
the violence that they sink into a state of psychological paralysis and be-
come unable to take any action at all to improve or alter the situation."5 3
The third phase of the cycle theory-the loving contrition phase-has
also been invoked to explain why battered women fail to leave violent
relationships. According to Walker, the batterer's "extremely loving, kind,
and contrite behavior" ' operates as a "positive reinforcement for remain-
ing in the relationship." 55 This loving behavior immediately follows the
acute battering incident and softens the woman's recollection of the ex-
tremely negative preceding phase. Hence, a woman suffers the paralysis
of learned helplessness due to the uncontrollable beatings, and, addition-
ally, is lured into staying by that hope that things will be different in the
future.
H". A CRITIQUE OF THE RESEARCH ON BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME
The validity of the evidence on battered woman syndrome has received
little critical attention in either the courtroom or the legal literature. 56
from their confinement; other dogs, though, never learned to escape. Id. at 260-61.
50 See M. Seligman, Helplessness: On Depression, Development, and Death (1975); Ab-
ramson, Seligman & Teasdale, Learned Helplessness in Humans: Critique and Reformula-
tion, 87 J. Abnormal Psychology 49, 50 (1978).
6' L. Walker (1984), supra note 2, at 87 (quoting L. Walker (1979), supra note 2, at 49).
52 97 N.J. 178, 478 A.2d 364 (1984).
53 Id. at 194, 478 A.2d at 372.
L. Walker (1979), supra note 2, at 65.
L. Walker (1984), supra note 2, at 96.
56 Courts in some battered woman cases deliberately eschew any examination of the re-
search methodology underlying the scientific evidence. In Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407
A.2d 626 (D.C. 1979), the court considered it improper for an appellate court to evaluate the
validity of scientific findings. In response to the dissents criticism of the sample size used in
one study, the court stated, "We do not understand the basis on which an appellate judge
can make a de novo determination here." Id. at 639 n.25. When courts do address the meth-
odological questions, the analysis tends to be superficial. For instance, in Buhrle v. State,
627. P.2d 1374 (Wyo. 1981), the court rejected the expert's testimony because it had not
been shown to be scientifically accepted, but the court did not take its analysis beyond the
assertion that the "defendant failed to demonstrate to the trial court that the state of the
art would permit a reasonable expert opinion." Id. at 1377.
Today most lawyers and judges are probably ill-prepared to evaluate the empirical valid-
ity of social science research. Two psychologists, hired by a prosecutor as expert witnesses in
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Critical review usually focuses on the applicability of researchers' conclu-
sions to the legal doctrine of self-defense, not on the validity of the con-
clusions themselves. 57 Commentators have smoothed over the numerous
analytical problems involved in applying theories of battered woman syn-
drome to self-defense cases, and they have wholly neglected the empirical
flaws of the research. This section begins with some general comments on
the role of battered woman syndrome researchers as expert witnesses.
Next, after briefly outlining the general requirements for the admissibil-
ity of scientific evidence, this section examines the methodological flaws
of the research on battered woman syndrome and the analytical weak-
nesses of the cycle and learned helplessness theories.
A. The Problem of Scientific Advocacy
Legal analyses of battered woman syndrome often perfunctorily dismiss
the significance of the time interval between the man's physical attacks
and the battered woman's deadly response s.5 Likewise, some battered wo-
man defendants seem to argue that since the attacks place the woman in
a constant state of fear, her defensive action is justified no matter when it
occurs.59 In effect, these defendants seek to stretch self-defense doctrine's
imminence requirement almost to infinity. The recent case of State v.
Martin0 illustrates the troubling implications of this line of thinking and
demonstrates Walkers's willingness to offer her testimony on battered
a battered woman self-defense case, relate their experience: "A cursory reading of the ex-
pert's research indicated a litany of errors that any properly trained social scientist would
have discovered. However, lawyers are not social scientists, and just communicating our con-
clusions to the prosecutor took many months." Gertz & True, Social Scientists in the Court-
room: The Frustrations of Two Expert Witnesses, in Courts and Criminal Justice: Emerging
Issues 81 (S. Talarico ed. 1985). As creative advocates increasingly employ social science
evidence in court, though, judges and other lawyers mist become more sophisticated in
their understanding of the validity and relevance of social science.
"' The legal scholarship in this area seems to accept uncritically the conclusions of the
social science researchers, with little regard for the reliability of the methods employed in
arriving at these conclusions. To date, only one piece of legal commentary has ventured
beyond the surface of the social science research to actually consider the accuracy of the
research findings themselves. See Acker & Toch, supra note 5, at 139-43.
"' See, e.g., Buda & Butler, supra note 5, at 375 ("A battered wife's perception of the
imminence of ... anger may reasonably encompass every moment in the presence of her
frequently violent husband."); Comment, Self-Defense, supra note 5, at 493-94 ("Although
she may not be receiving an actual physical attack at the time [of her self-defensive action],
she nevertheless believes that her life is in imminent danger."); Note, Wife's Dilemma,
supra note 5, at 929 ("[I]t makes little sense for the law to excuse the wife's killing if it
occurs while she is being beaten, but to find her guilty of murder if she kills during a tempo-
rary respite between beatings.").
51 See, e.g., State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 478 A.2d 364 (1984).
10 666 S.W.2d 895 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
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woman syndrome even in extremely implausible cases.
Helen Martin separated from her husband Ronald in September, 1980,
after a violent five-year marriage. 1 Ronald moved in with another woman
and talked about blowing up Helen's house for the insurance money.
Helen feared he would do it while she was in the house. Helen hired Rob-
ert Bratcher for $10,000 to kill Ronald. On December 5, 1980, after Ron-
ald came to the house to sign some papers, Bratcher emerged from his
basement hiding place and shot Ronald in the neck. Bratcher shot him a
second time after Helen complained, "He's not dying fast enough-hit
him again. ' 's2 Helen later went out to celebrate a friend's birthday. The
next day, December 6, Helen reported her husband missing. On Decem-
ber 7 she paid the premiums on her husband's life insurance policies.
Ronald's body was found on the 8th and she confessed to her involvement
in his murder on the 9th."s
Martin was convicted of murder.6 She appealed her conviction on the
ground, among others, that the trial court erred in refusing to admit evi-
dence on battered woman syndrome.6 5 Martin had planned to introduce
expert testimony by Lenore Walker.6 The Missouri Court of Appeals,
however, rejected Martin's contention that as a result of repeated beat-
ings she had reasonably believed she was in imminent danger of death or
serious bodily harm.67 The court held that the expert testimony was prop-
erly excluded, asserting that "the evidence here falls woefully short of
establishing an issue of justifiable self-defense."6 s
On one hand, Walker's willingness to testify in Martin might be ex-
plained as simply another instance of scientific expertise entering the ad-
versarial process: since this process will generally screen out irrelevant
evidence, the expert herself need not decide whether the testimony is ap-
propriate in any given case. On the other hand, though, Walker's in-
tended role in Martin is deeply disturbing. That the leading theoretician
of battered woman syndrome would be willing to characterize Martin as a
case of legitimate self-defense seems to call into question the credibility
of her testimony in other cases. Certainly, few cases are as far removed
from the paradigm of self-defense as Martin,69 but it is precisely this will-
61 Id. at 897.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 897-98.
" Id. at 897.
65 Id. at 899.
"Id.
17 See id. at 899-901.
" Id. at 899.
", Martin is not unique, however. See, e.g., State v. Leaphart, 673 S.W.2d 870, 872 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1983) (defendant hired a man to kill her husband and later sought to establish
[Vol. 72:619632
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ingness of experts to take the stand in extreme cases that reinforces the
perception among many lawyers that psychologists and psychiatrists are
simply "hired guns.
7 0
B. Analytical and Methodological Criticisms
Of even greater concern than advocacy accompanying the expert wit-
ness into the courtroom is advocacy accompanying the researcher into the
laboratory. Walker explicitly recognizes her sympathy for battered
women,7 1 and courts have criticized the bias this sympathetic perspective
engenders. According to the court in Buhrle v. State,7 2 for example,
Walker's statements in The Battered Woman and on voir dire suggested
"that Dr. Walker may make certain conclusions and state certain theo-
ries, then engage in research to attempt to substantiate those theories
and conclusions.17 3 This section criticizes Walker's work in light of the
prevailing evidentiary requirements for the admissibility of scientific
evidence.
self-defense using battered woman syndrome evidence).
70 See generally Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals, and Science: An Analysis of Mental
Health Law, 51 S. Cal. L. Rev. 527 (1978) (arguing that the use of mental health profession-
als as expert witnesses dilutes the role of moral issues in the criminal law). But see Bonnie
& Slobogin, The Role of Mental Health Professionals in the Criminal Process: The Case for
Informed Speculation, 66 Va. L. Rev. 427 (1980) (contending that courts should permit
mental health professionals to offer opinions as expert witnesses).
" In the introduction of The Battered Woman, Walker describes her perspective as
follows:
I am aware that this book is written from a feminist vision. It is a picture of what
happens in a domestic violent act from the perspective of only one of the two parties.
The men do not have equal rebuttal time. Rather, I view women as victims in order
to understand what the toll of such domestic violence is like for them. Unfortunately,
in doing so I tend to place all men in an especially negative light, instead of just those
men who do commit such crimes.
L. Walker (1979), supra note 2, at xvii. In the preface to her more recent book, Walker
recognizes the difficulties in treating her subject dispassionately but suggests that her own
work has somehow managed to remain objective:
It is foolish for academicians and professionals to stand behind the cloak of objectiv-
ity in a field of study as politicized as this. Wife-beating has been with us for as long
as we have historical records, but there were few attempts to understand or change it
until the feminists politicized it. . . . Neutrality or objectivity by anyone in this field,
where estimates of incidence rates run higher than half of the population, is unlikely
unless special precautions are used, such as those taken by a researcher.
L. Walker (1984), supra note 2, at x-xi.
1' 627 P.2d 1374 (Wyo. 1981).
71 Id. at 1377; see also Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 455 A.2d 893, 894-95 (D.C. 1983)
(Gallagher, J., concurring) (quoting at length from The Battered Woman and criticizing
Walker's bias).
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1. The Admissibility of Scientific Evidence
In determining the admissibility of novel scientific evidence, courts
usually employ either the "general acceptance" test or the "relevancy"
test.1 4 The classic formulation of the general acceptance test was set forth
by the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia in Frye v. United
States.7 Under this test, a relevant scientific principle or discovery will
be admitted if it has become generally accepted by scientists in the par-
ticular field of study.76 Alternatively, the relevancy test" treats scientific
evidence much like ordinary evidence.78 Scientific evidence is admissible
if it is relevant to a disputed fact in the case and if an expert testifies as
to its validity.79 At a theoretical level the two tests differ in the extent to
which they require scientific evidence to be accepted in its field of ori-
gin.0 In practice, however, the tests are quite similar; both focus on the
74 See C. McCormick, McCormick on Evidence § 203, at 605 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984).
75 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). In an oft-quoted passage the court stated:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimen-
tal and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the
evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long
way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle
or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently estab-
lished to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
Id. at 1014.
76 See id.
7 See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 702 ("If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.").
78 Nonscientific evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less proba-
ble than it would be without the evidence." Fed. R. Evid. 401.
79 See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 702. Rules of evidence do not establish the criteria of relevance.
The court must rely on logic and experience to ascertain the probative value of evidence. As
Professor Gianelli notes, however, "[t]he probative value of scientific evidence. . .is con-
nected inextricably to its reliability." Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evi-
dence: Frye v. United States, a Half-Century Later, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 1197, 1235 (1980).
"Reliability," as Giannelli uses the term, refers to "the validity of the underlying principle,
...of the technique applying that principle, and.., the proper application of the tech-
nique on a particular occasion." Id. at 1200-01 (footnote omitted). The validity of the re-
search is thus the key to its probative value as evidence. Scientists distinguish between two
types of validity in research findings, internal validity and external validity. Internal valid-
ity involves the accuracy of the conclusions drawn in the study itself. External validity con-
cerns the extent to which the findings of the study can be generalized to other situations.
See J. Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Science in Law: Cases and Materials 33-81
(1985); P. Robinson, Fundamentals of Experimental Psychology- A Comparative Approach
92-99 (1976).
so Under the relevancy test it is sufficient for one or two experts to testify that the evi-
dence is valid. See C. McCormick, Law of Evidence § 170, at 363 (1954) ("Any relevant
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validity of the scientific testimony offered as evidence.8 '
Significant dispute surrounds the issue of precisely what it is that must
be found valid. Here again the courts tend to split along two lines. One
view holds that only the methodology used to obtain the results need pass
judicial scrutiny. As the court in Ibn-Tamas v. United States2 succinctly
stated, "Satisfaction of the criterion [of admissibility] begins-and
ends-with a determination of whether there is a general acceptance of a
particular methodology, not an acceptance, beyond that, of particular
study results based on that methodology."88 According to this view, the
court simply identifies the relevant scientific field and determines
whether the researcher's methodology is valid by the standards of that
field; if the methodology passes this test, the jury assumes responsibility
for evaluating the substance of the research findings.8 4
Under the second and more exacting approach, the court determines
the validity not only of the underlying methodology but also of the results
this methodology yields. The court, not the jury, evaluates the strength of
the scientific findings. The trial court in State v. Hawthorne,8 5 for exam-
ple, rejected the scientific evidence on battered woman syndrome because
the "depth of study in this field has not yet reached the point where an
expert witness can give testimony with any degree of assurance . ..."So
Whichever of these two approaches87 a court adopts, it must as a
conclusions which are supported by a qualified expert witness should be received unless
there are other reasons for exclusion."). By contrast, under the general acceptance test even
the testimony of several experts may not be enough to secure admission of the evidence;
there must be a consensus in the applicable field that the evidence is sound. See Gianelli,
supra note 79, at 1205.
81 Professor Gianelli argues that Frye sets forth a more conservative test and imposes'
more restrictions on the use of scientific evidence. The relevancy approach, he claims, suf-
fers from the leniency of the requisite showing of reliability, since "probative value could be
established by the assertions of one expert." Giannelli, supra note 79, at 1236. Professor
Saltzburg contends, however, that "it is not very helpful to debate the question whether
Frye or a relevance approach to scientific evidence is preferable." Saltzburg, Frye and Alter-
natives, 99 F.R.D. 208, 209 (1983). He continues:
The two approaches are essentially the same, despite the frequency with which they
are assumed to differ. The question that is more significant is how much success a
scientific claim must have before courts will rely on it. The answer to this question
should be the same under Frye or a relevance approach.
Id.
' 407 A.2d 626 (D.C. 1979).
,3 Id. at 638.
4 See Comment, Self-Defense, supra note 5, at 505-06 ("If the methods are acceptable,
the different conclusions, interpretations, and criticisms of that method should go to the
weight which the testimony is given and not to its admissibility.").
" 470 So. 2d 770 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (affrming trial court's holding).
58 Id. at 773.
' Both of the prevailing approaches treat scientific findings as factual evidence. Once the
1986]
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threshold matter consider whether the scientific evidence in question
sheds light on the facts at issue in the case and whether the researcher
correctly employed a valid methodology. Thus, in battered woman cases
the court should at a minimum ensure that the evidence is genuinely rele-
vant to a material aspect of the self-defense claim and that the researcher
offering to testify has correctly applied the methodology of the general
field of clinical psychology. To stop short of this inquiry, as courts and
commentators have done,"8 is to risk exposing the jury to unsound and
potentially prejudicial"9 evidence. This approach satisfies neither the gen-
eral acceptance nor the relevancy tests.90 If research cloaks itself in the
garb of an accepted scientific field, the court must examine the suitability
of the fit. If the research violates basic tenets of its field, it should not go
to the jury with the imprimatur of science.
2. Flaws in the Cycle Theory
Presented in the awe-inspiring language of science, Walker's cycle the-
ory has been widely accepted by the courts.91 Close analysis, though,
reveals that Walker's research actually provides little empirical support
for the cycle theory. Walker tested her theory through a series of inter-
views in which interviewers questioned subjects 2 concerning four bat-
evidence is admitted, the jurors evaluate it as they see fit. In a recent article, Professors
Monahan and Walker propose a fundamentally different approach to social science evi-
dence. The courts, they argue, should treat social science research, or "social authority," in
much the same way as legal precedent. The trial court, in their view, should consider the
validity and relevance of proffered social authority and give it the weight, if any, it merits.
The court should then instruct the jury on the relevant social authority just as it does on
the relevant law. At the appellate level the court should take the research into account as it
sees fit. See Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority Obtaining, Evaluating and Es-
tablishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. Pa. L. Rev. 477 (1986).
- See, e.g., Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 612, 277 S.E.2d 678 (1981); State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d
892 (Me. 1981); Comment, Self-Defense, supra note 5.
"' Even where the underlying scientific evidence is sound, expert testimony may unfairly
prejudice the jury. The jury may be inclined to give the expert testimony undue weight
because it has an "aura of special reliability and trustworthiness." United States v. Amarel,
488 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1973). The trial court may exclude relevant expert testimony if
necessary to prevent unfair prejudice. See, e.g., Fed R. Evid. 403.
90 Cf. Giannelli, supra note 79, at 1214 (rather than "focusing on the problems associated
with empirical validation, the courts have confused the issue by concentrating on the quali-
fications of experts").
91 See Ibn-Tamas, 407 A.2d at 626; State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d 892 (Me. 1981); State v.
Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 478 A.2d 364 (1984); State v. Allery, 101 Wash. 2d 591, 682 P.2d 312
(1984).
92 The subjects for Walker's 1984 research consisted of 400 "self-identified" battered
women living in six states. L. Walker (1984), supra note 2, at 202. Walker explains, "A
woman was considered eligible to participate if she reported that she was battered at least
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tering incidents-the first, the second, one of the worst and the most re-
cent. Walker explains:
After the description of each incident, basing her judgment on
both the open-ended description and a series of closed-ended ques-
tions concerning the batterer's behavior before the event ("Would
you call it. . .irritable, provocative, aggressive, hostile, threaten-
ing?"-each on a 1-5 scale) and after the event ("nice, loving, con-
trite"), the interviewer recorded whether or not there was "evi-
dence of tension building and/or loving contrition."93
Walker's research design contains five major, readily identifiable method-
ological and interpretive flaws, each of which calls into question the valid-
ity of the cycle theory.
First, although Walker gives only sketchy details on the procedure used
to establish the existence of the behavioral cycle, the interviewers' use of
leading questions renders the subjects' responses suspect. It comes as no
surprise that when asked, "Would you call it. . .?", a majority of sub-
jects noted "tension building and/or loving contrition." This may well
have been the result of "hypothesis guessing"9 4 on the part of the sub-
jects. In many studies the hypotheses of the experimenters are not diffi-
cult to discern, and subjects may simply supply the researchers with what
they want to hear. Properly executed social science research involving
human subjects carefully guards against this behavior.95 When possible,
experimenters should disguise their hypotheses." Under no circumstances
should a researcher permit her hypotheses to become as obvious to her
subjects as Walker did.
The above-quoted paragraph reveals a second and related source of dif-
ficulty. Walker derives her evidence of "tension building and/or loving
contrition" not from the subjects' responses directly but instead from the
interviewers' evaluations of those responses. This arrangement made the
two times by a man with whom she had an intimate or marital relationship. The criteria for
physical abuse was any form of a coercive physical act, with or without resultant injury." Id.
Walker did not use a control group of women with which to compare her sample's responses.
Id. at 203. For a discussion of Walker's failure to use a control group, see infra notes 122-124
and accompanying text. About half of the women in the sample reported on nonbattering
relationships, however, and Walker used these data for comparison purposes. Walker's re-
searchers interviewed the battered women individually using a structured, 200-page ques-
tionnaire. This questionnaire contained a number of questions developed specifically for
this study, id. at 226, and also incorporated several standardized scales, id. at 233.
,3 L. Walker (1984), supra note 2, at 96.
94For a discussion of hypothesis guessing, see T. Cook & D. Campbell, Quasi-Experimen-
tation: Design and Analysis Issues for Field Settings 66 (1979).
95 See id.
See id. at 67.
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research susceptible to the problem of experimenter expectancies.9 7 Just
as a subject may tailor her responses to fit what she believes the experi-
menter wants to hear, so too may the experimenter's expectations color
her interpretation of the data the subject provides.98 Cook and Campbell,
in their seminal study of experimental designs, suggest that this danger
"can be decreased by employing experimenters who have no expectations
or have false expectations, or by analyzing the data separately for [experi-
menters who] have different kinds or levels of expectancy."99 Allowing
experimenters with obvious expectations to substitute their judgment in
place of the subjects' responses clearly violates this basic precept. Indeed,
it would be difficult to fashion a design more conducive to experimenter
expectancies than the one used by Walker. 100
The third and perhaps the most legally significant flaw in Walker's de-
velopment of the cycle theory is her failure to place the three phases of
the cycle within any sort of time frame.101 For example, tension building
that occurs only fifteen minutes prior to an acute battering episode does
not seem to constitute a "constant state of fear." By contrast, tension
building that lasts several days and always culminates in a severe beating
assumes tremendous legal significance in a self-defense case. Moreover,
Walker's data and discussion do not indicate whether a period of normal-
ity occurs between loving contrition and resumed tension building. If a
period of normality does occur, this would suggest that the cycle actually
has four phases, a complication Walker does not consider. Finally, by
concentrating on only four beating episodes, Walker's research tells us
nothing about tension building episodes that do not lead to severe
beatings.
The fourth flaw in Walker's work is her failure to relate empirically the
cycle of violence to the "cumulative terror" that purportedly grips the
defendant in the interim between the batterer's attack and her response.
Supporters of battered woman syndrome testimony have understood




10 To her credit, Walker does note that "[c]omparisons between interviewers' responses
indicated a high level of agreement," L. Walker (1984), supra note 2, at 96, suggesting the
reliability of the interviewers' observations. Yet Walker presents no data showing the level
of agreement and does not explain how she made the comparisons.
101 Although the cycle theory is silent as to the timing of the various phases of the cycle,
Walker's arguments implicitly recognize that timing is a central issue. See, e.g., Walker,
Battered Women, Psychology, and Public Policy, 39 Am. Psychologist 1178, 1179 (1984)
("Self-defense laws... require the perception of danger to be imminent and have not rec-
ognized the reasonableness of prediction of imminence based on a history of repeated vio-
lence.") (emphasis added).
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in the second one, the woman is consumed by fear and feels powerless to
do anything to end the violence." 102 Yet this conclusion receives little
support from the research.
Walker asked her subjects, "Did you think he ever would or could kill
you?" Forty-eight percent said "yes"; twenty-six percent said "yes, if mad
enough"; twelve percent said "yes, accidently"; six percent said "maybe";
and eight percent said "never."103 Thus, eighty-six percent of the women
believed their husbands were capable of killing them under some circum-
stances. At the same time, fifty percent of the women believed they could
kill their husbands under some circumstances.1 04 There are serious
problems in extrapolating from this data to the proposition that women
caught in the cycle of violence are consumed by "constant fear." Fore-
most, the research does not link the women's fear of harm with any of the
specific stages of the cycle. Also, only slightly less than half of the women
in the sample responded with an unequivocal "yes," meaning that the
rest probably experienced something less than a state of terror. Finally,
all of the women Walker questioned were battered women.105 Sound ex-
perimental design would require that other women-possibly some in-
volved in discordant but nonviolent marriages-also be questioned for
purposes of comparison.106
The fifth major flaw lies in Walker's conclusion that her findings estab-
lish the existence of a distinct behavioral cycle. If the cycle theory is to
have any coherence, it must refer to the occurrence of all three
stages-tension building, leading to the acute battering incident, followed
by loving contrition-in a single relationship. Walker relates her data to
the cycle theory as follows:
In 65% of all cases.., there was evidence of a tension-building
phase prior to the battering. In 58% of all cases there was evidence
of loving contrition afterward. In general, then, there is support for
the cycle theory of violence in a majority of the battering incidents
described by our sample.1 0 7
Walker's data do not support her conclusion. She provides data on the
tension building and loving contrition phases separately, and obviously
this separated data provides little insight into the percentage of women
who experienced all three phases as a "cycle." If sixty-five percent of all
subjects experienced tension building before an acute battering incident
101 Note, Wife's Dilemma, supra note 5, at 928.
101 L. Walker (1984), supra note 2, at 177.
104 Id.
1* See supra note 92.
106 See P. Robinson, supra note 79, at 207; infra notes 122-124 and accompanying text.
107 L. Walker (1984), supra note 2, at 96-97.
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and fifty-eight percent of all subjects experienced loving contrition after
an acute battering incident, then it is likely that only about thirty-eight
percent of the women actually experienced the entire cycle. 08 Thus, it is
not at all clear that, as Walker asserts, the "data support the existence of
the Walker Cycle Theory of violence."' '
In addition to these five methodological flaws in Walker's research it-
self, there is a difficulty in Walker's facile application of the cycle theory
to cases in which a woman has killed her mate. As noted in Part I, self-
defense doctrine justifies only the defendant's use of a reasonable amount
of force in repelling the threatened danger; 10 a corollary of this principle
is that the defender may employ deadly force only in response to the ag-
gressor's threat of deadly force."' Even assuming the validity of the cycle
theory, the theory does not provide a jury with any insights into the pre-
cise nature of the harm a woman perceives at the time she strikes out at
the batterer. The theory posits that the cyclical nature of the violence
subjects the woman to the fear that she is in danger of imminent harm,
but the theory does not differentiate between perceptions of deadly harm
and perceptions of lesser sorts of harm. Where a woman has resorted to
deadly force in self-defense, the central issue is likely to be whether this
degree of force was commensurate with the harm she perceived. On this
issue Walker's research adds nothing to the jury's understanding.
3. The Misapplication of Learned Helplessness Theory
Like her cycle theory, Walker's adaptation of the learned helplessness
concept is flawed, suffering from both theoretical inconsistency and the
use of an inadequate research methodology. Walker uses the theory in a
way that overlooks a crucial finding of Seligman's original research.112 In
108 This figure is obtained by employing the basic rule for deriving the joint probability of
independent events. The probability of the joint occurrence of independent events is equal
to the product of their individual probabilities. W. Hays, Statistics 42 (3d ed. 1981). Thus,
to calculate the probability that a woman experienced the entire cycle, the probability that
a woman experienced tension building before an acute battering incident (65%) is multi-
plied by the probability that a woman experienced loving contrition after an acute battering
incident (58%). This calculation yields the 38% figure. Of course, this result is merely a
probabilistic estimation, and it assumes that tension building and loving contrition are inde-
pendent variables, which may not be the case. Still, even if all of the women experiencing
loving contrition were among the 65% experiencing tension building, no more than 58%
could have experienced the entire cycle. At the same time, the proportion experiencing the
entire cycle could have been as low as 23% (the sum of 58% and 65% is 123%; because the
entire sample constitutes only 100%, 23% must have experienced both phases).
209 L. Walker (1984), supra note 2, at 9.
210 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
" See supra note 12.
112 See Seligman, Maier & Geer, supra note 48.
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Seligman's experiment, once the dogs were rendered helpless, researchers
found it extremely difficult, and in some cases impossible, to retrain the
dogs to exercise control over their environment. 1 3 Thus, from a theoreti-
cal perspective one would predict that if battered women suffered from
learned helplessness they would not assert control over their environ-
ment; certainly, one would not predict such a positive assertion of control
as killing the batterer.
4
In an attempt to explain what has triggered battered women to use
deadly force, Walker conjectures that "[t]he women felt that no one took
them seriously, that they alone had to protect themselves against brutal
attacks, and that they knew by observable changes in the man's physical
or mental state that this time he really would kill them."" 5 Clearly,
though, this explanation contradicts the basic insight of learned helpless-
ness theory. For a battered woman to realize that she alone has to protect
herself is antithetical to the notion that she is unable to assert control
over her environment. If at the time of her action the battered woman
believes she could be killed and recognizes that she must help herself, the
claim of self-defense might be reasonable. But on these questions the jury
must consider the individual circumstances of each case; Walker's gener-
alizations concerning learned helplessness have no relevance to these
issues.
Walker's examination of learned helplessness also suffers from a flawed
research design. She compared women still in battering relationships with
women no longer in such relationships."' She hypothesized that the
women still in battering relationships would exhibit more learned help-
lessness than the others. This learned helplessness, she believed, would
manifest itself by the women still in the battering relationships being
more fearful, anxious, and depressed, and less angry, disgusted, and hos-
tile.117 She compared the two groups' responses on these variables for the
last three beating episodes.'
There is little theoretical basis for Walker's selection of these factors as
the variables representing learned helplessness. These are all factors that
may be related to or correlated with learned helplessness, but there is no
" See id. at 260-61.
114 Learned helplessness theory describes a pattern of essentially passive behavior, and, as
Gelles and Cornell note, "Most battered women are far from passive." Gelles & Cornell,
supra note 1, at 77. Indeed, women subject to constant abuse assert themselves in many
ways; they "call the police, they go to social workers or mental health agencies, they flee to
shelters or the homes of friends or parents." Id.
115 L. Walker (1984), supra note 2, at 40.
1s See id. at 203.
,x' See id. at 87-89.
118 See id. at 86-89.
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evidence that they are uniquely indicative of that condition. When
Walker presents her data, she compounds the problem by lumping to-
gether the mean scores for fear, anxiety, and depression on the one hand
and those for anger, disgust, and hostility on the other hand.119 Such a
compound score has little value as a measurement of all three variables as
a group; a high compound score may simply be the result of a high re-
sponse on one variable and average or slightly low responses on the other
two. More startling is Walker's complete failure to conduct any tests of
statistical significance and her willingness to cite seemingly minute differ-
ences in scores as support for her theory.12 0 She asserts that the "results
are compatible with learned helplessness theory,"'' but neither her data
nor her analysis supports this conclusion.
The most legally significant flaw in Walker's research design is her fail-
ure to interview women who were never in battering relationships. 22 Such
a control group would provide valuable and necessary data with which to
compare the responses of abused women.1 2 The success of a self-defense
claim usually turns on the reasonableness of the defendant's action-how
the action compares with what others would be expected to do in the
same situation. 2 4 Walker's failure to study a control group makes it im-
possible for her to draw valid conclusions as to the reasonableness of a
battered woman's behavior.
Finally, an obvious limitation to Walker's research is the simple fact
that most of her subjects did not kill anyone. Although she had nine
women in her sample who had killed their batterers, 25 she does not pro-
vide any comparisons between those who killed and those who did not. 2
I"' See id. at 88.
120 See id. at 89.
121 Id.
122 Walker explains her decision to omit this fundamental element of empirical research:
"No control group was utilized for comparisons because of the time and expense involved
.... [This study] was seen as an opportunity to empirically identify relevant variables in
preparation for subsequent research that could then utilize control of meaningful variables."
Id. at 203. Thus, Walker's conclusions, as she admits, can be viewed only as tentative, offer-
ing insights to be investigated in "subsequent research."
123 Cf. Rosenbaum & O'Leary, Marital Violence: Characteristics of Abusive Couples, 49 J.
Consulting and Clinical Psychology 63, 69 (1981) (evaluating the characteristics associated
with spouse abuse by comparing violent couples with nonviolent but discordant couples and
harmonious couples).
124 See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
125 L. Walker (1984), supra note 2, at 39.
12 Professor Browne recently conducted a study comparing battered women who have
killed their batterers with battered women who have not. She found several factors that
distinguished women in the "homicide group," including "severity of the woman's injuries,
the man's drug use and frequency of intoxication, the frequency with which abusive inci-
dents occured, forced or threatened sexual acts by the man, the woman's suicide threats,
642 [Vol. 72:619
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The economic, social, and emotional circumstances of the two groups may
be very different. The factors that lead one woman to kill while others
escape or continue to suffer beatings may or may not be relevant to the
claim of self-defense, but if these subpopulations differ, it clearly calls
into question the generalizations Walker derives from her research on
learned helplessness.
III. DEFENDING BATrERED WOMEN
The research on battered woman syndrome is not yet sufficiently devel-
oped to merit its use as evidence in self-defense cases, but the basic in-
sight informing the work of Walker and her followers is sound: a rigid,
formalistic application of the traditional standard of justifiable self-de-
fense unfairly ignores the special circumstances surrounding a battered
woman's attack on her mate. By asking only what a highly abstracted
"reasonable person" would do, 127 the law turns a blind eye to the woman's
history of abuse, to the social and economic pressures preventing her
from leaving, and to her engrossing fear.
Because of the peculiar predicament of battered women, courts should
eschew the formalistic rhetoric surrounding the reasonable person test 128
and instead focus on the important underlying circumstances of these dif-
ficult cases. Indeed, it is too simplistic to distinguish between the objec-
tive analysis of self-defense claims, in which the jury considers only what
a "reasonable person" would have done, and the subjective analysis, in
which the jury fully adopts the defendant's perspective and evaluates
only the honesty of her belief.1 29 It is more accurate to view these tests as
lying at opposite ends of a continuum of possible approaches. As the jury
increasingly adopts the defendant's point of view, the objective standard
merges with the subjective standard. 80
The crucial issue, therefore, is to what extent the jury should be al-
lowed to inquire into the individual capacities or circumstances of the
defendant. As Professor Fletcher argues, an individual inquiry is neces-
sary to allow the jury to understand fully the defendant's claim.' 3 ' Profes-
sor Schneider extends this approach to battered women's cases and con-
and the man's threats to kill." Browne, Family Homicide: When Victimized Women Kill, in
Handbook of Family Violence (forthcoming).
127 See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
"2 See W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 11, at 392.
"' See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
10 See Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 Stan. L.
Rev. 591, 636 (1981); see also supra notes 20-26 and accompanying text (discussion of
Wanrow).
1" Fletcher, The Individualization of Excusing Conditions, 47 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1269, 1292-
93 (1974).
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tends that without an individualized inquiry jurors might misinterpret
the incident and perhaps fall prey to a "stereotypical attitude toward the
circumstances surrounding the woman's act." 132 Understanding the con-
text in which the woman acted is essential to understanding the reasona-
bleness of her act. To be sure, Walker and other researchers recognize the
abused woman's own situation as the factor that most strongly contrib-
utes to her sense of entrapment and fear. Unfortunately, their focus in
the courtroom tends to be the psyche of the defendant rather than her
environment, leading courts to refer to battered women defendants as
though they suffered from some identifiable ailment with easily recogniz-
able symptoms or behavior patterns.1 3 3 This tendency probably stems in
part from the use of the word "syndrome" to describe the phenomenon in
question.13 4 Researchers have not, however, convincingly demonstrated
that the battering experience gives rise to a single distinctive behavior
pattern. It is a mistake to use one theoretical construct to describe all
women who are victims of domestic violence.
Rather than considering an expert's dubious generalizations on bat-
tered woman syndrome, the jury should take into account the circum-
stances predating the individual woman's self-defensive act. As in State
v. Wanrow, the court should allow the jury to evaluate the defendant's
act "in light of all the facts and circumstances known to [her], including
those known substantially before the killing."'' 35 Thus, the court should
admit testimony-by the defendant or others familiar with her situa-
tion-about the violence in the defendant's relationship with the dece-
dent.3 8 Such testimony might illuminate the woman's fear of harm, her
132 Schneider, supra note 14, at 640; see also Crocker, supra note 5, at 132 ("Rather than
focusing on the hypothetical reasonable man, individualization demands that the jury in-
quire into the individual defendant's characteristics and culpability.").
1s3 See, e.g., State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 192, 478 A.2d 364, 371 (1984) (describing battered
woman syndrome as "a series of common characteristics that appear in women who are
abused").
134 One significant concern with Walker's characterization of battered women as "help-
less" and "suffering" from battered women syndrome is that such characterizations may
serve to perpetuate existing sexual stereotypes. Schneider, who urges an individualized in-
quiry into the abused woman's circumstances, states:
[E]xpert testimony not clearly tied to the individual woman defendant's circum-
stances and perspective should be used with care. Such testimony may suggest to the
trier of fact that there is a "battered woman's syndrome" defense, which could en-
courage sexual stereotyping. Thus, the use of expert witnesses is often prudently fore-
gone, especially where the defendant is credible and articulate.
Schneider, supra note 14, at 646.
135 Wanrow, 88 Wash. 2d at 234, 559 P.2d at 555.
336 In State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 478 A.2d 364 (1984), the court recognized the relevance
of such testimony and its high probative value:
It is well settled that when there is evidence of prior physical abuse of defendant by
[Vol. 72:619
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inability to escape, the unresponsiveness of police,13 7 and her lack of other
alternatives. All of these factors are relevant to the reasonableness of her
self-defensive action.
In addition, courts should permit juries to consider valid empirical evi-
dence, evidence that derives from a correct application of a valid scien-
tific methodology. For example, although learned helplessness theory
does not satisfactorily explain a woman's failure to leave the battering
relationship, other researchers have identified factors that may be linked
to a woman's "decision" to stay. Chief among these are economic and
social factors.1 8 Staying with a violent man might be the only reasonable
alternative when a woman has no economic resources and no family or
friends to support her and her children. Perhaps jurors need only be told
that many women do not leave violent relationships because they believe
they have no choice.139
the decedent, the jury must be told that a finding of provocation may be premised on
"a course of ill treatment which can induce a homicidal response in a person of ordi-
nary firmness and which the accused reasonably believes is likely to continue."
Id. at 218-19, 478 A.2d at 384 (quoting State v. Guido, 40 N.J. 191, 211, 191 A.2d 45, 56
(1963)); see also Acker & Toch, supra note 5, at 137 ("Most people realize that past en-
counters may color perceptions, and the psychology involved in this process is neither com-
plicated nor foreign to lay thinking. No expert testimony is needed to 'explain' that prior
harms breed present fears.").
117 See generally Finesmith, Police Response to Battered Women: A Critique and Propos-
als for Reform, 14 Seton Hall L. Rev. 74 (1983) (discussing police guidelines for intervention
in domestic violence).
138 Research amply supports these less theory-oriented generalizations. For example,
Professors Kalmuss and Straus found the following:
The primary group of women who tolerate severe violence are those highest in objec-
tive dependency [i.e., economic dependency]. For such women it is not a question of
necessary motivation to overcome the obstacles keeping them in abusive marriages,
because, in a sense, the obstacles for them are insurmountable. They have virtually
no alternatives to their marriages and, therefore, "must" tolerate the conditions of
those marriages.
Kalmuss & Straus, Wife's Marital Dependency and Wife Abuse, 44 J. Marriage & Fam. 277,
284-85 (1982); see also Strube & Barbour, The Decision to Leave an Abusive Relationship:
Economic Dependence and Psychological Commitment, 45 J. Marriage & Fam. 785 (1983)
(concluding that economic dependence is a significant factor in the woman's decision to
remain in an abusive relationship).
139 The court itself could convey this information through instructions to the jury instead
of admitting an expert to testify to the same effect. For instance, where eyewitness identifi-
cation is in dispute, Professor Grano recommends that the court review the scientific re-
search and instruct the jury on factors reliably found to interfere with eyewitness perception
and recall. Grano, Kirby, Biggers, and Ash: Do Any Constitutional Safeguards Remain
Against the Danger of Convicting the Innocent?, 72 Mich. L. Rev. 719, 796 (1974). See gen-
erally S. Saltzburg, American Criminal Procedure: Cases and Commentary 574-76 (2d ed.
1984) (discussing the efficacy of cautionary jury instructions). This approach of allowing the
court, rather than an expert, to synthesize scientific evidence would help prevent the jury
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In short, the courts should allow the battered woman defendant to es-
tablish the reasonableness of her conduct through the introduction of evi-
dence concerning her inability to leave the violent relationship and her
perceptions of imminent harm at the time of the killing. The standard of
justifiable self-defense would remain "objective" in that the jury would
determine the reasonableness of the defendant's action as distinct from
her honest belief that self-defense was necessary; but, as in Wanrow, the
jury would do so with an awareness of all the circumstances facing the
defendant at the time of her action."
Jurisdictions unwilling to adopt fully the Wanrow approach could nev-
ertheless allow a limited subjective inquiry. Most jurisdictions permit the
introduction of evidence on the victim's violent disposition,"" which
bears on the reasonableness of the defendant's action. If the defendant
knew that an assault was coming, her preemptive defensive action may
indeed have been reasonable. Conversely, some explanation may be
needed where a woman who has endured years of abuse suddenly strikes
out in apparent revenge or with little provocation; the defense must show
what triggered the deadly attack. In the absence of a reasonable explana-
tion, the defendant could be found guilty of murder or some lesser in-
cluded offense.14
2
The unique circumstances surrounding battering relationships require a
flexible and perhaps unique application of the elements of the self-de-
fense claim. Still, the four elements of self-defense should not be
stretched into oblivion. The jury should consider the context in which the
battered woman acted, but unreliable evidence should not come cloaked
in the speciously objective garb of expert witness testimony. Research on
battered woman syndrome does not yet deserve admission as evidence
with the imprimatur of science. Instead, the woman's history of abuse
should be admitted in those cases where it appears relevant to the reason-
ableness of her perception of imminent harm at the time of the killing. In
some cases, the history of violence should be excluded as evidence be-
cause it is so unrelated to the deadly encounter that its relevance does
from misinterpreting the wife's failure to escape her violent relationship. It would expose
the jury to important probative evidence while at the same time shielding it from unreliable
and potentially prejudicial expert testimony.
140 See Wanrow, 88 Wash. 2d at 235, 559 P.2d at 556.
141 See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 404(a)(2); see also Annot., 1 A.L.R. 3rd 571, 575 (1965) ("[T]he
defendant, after laying a proper foundation by evidence tending to show that in committing
the homicide or assault he acted in self-defense, may introduce evidence of the turbulent
and dangerous character of the deceased.").
12 See State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 816 (N.D. 1983) (describing lesser included
offenses for which a defendant might be convicted where she acted unreasonably in self-
defense).
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not outweigh its prejudicial impact.' 43 The courts must make this deter-
mination on a case-by-case basis. Although this approach creates some
uncertainty, a bright-line rule admitting the evidence is far more likely to
expose the jury to unreliable testimony.
IV. CONCLUSION
The prevailing theories of battered woman syndrome have little eviden-
tiary value in self-defense cases. The work of Lenore Walker, the leading
researcher on battered woman syndrome, is unsound and largely irrele-
vant to the central issues in such cases. The Walker cycle theory suffers
from significant methodological and intepretive flaws that render it inca-
pable of explaining why an abused woman strikes out at her mate when
she does. Similarly, Walker's application of learned helplessness to the
situation of battered women does not account for the actual behavior of
many women who remain in battering relationships. Thus, in self-defense
cases a court should not allow the jury to consider evidence on battered
woman syndrome.
Cases involving battered women clearly pose a significant challenge to
self-defense doctrine. Mechanical application of the traditional objective
standard is unduly harsh because it fails to appreciate the forces at work
in a battering relationship. To avoid this harshness, the court should ad-
mit into evidence relevant and reliable empirical findings, particularly
those on the economic and social factors that force women to remain in
violent relationships. In addition, the jury should be allowed to hear testi-
mony on the decedent's prior history of violence toward the defendant.
Consideration of such evidence should better equip the jury to do justice
to the battered woman.
David L. Faigman
143 See Fed. R. Evid. 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice .. ).
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